The Protection of Religious Freedom Under the American Constitution by Sedler, Robert A.
Wayne State University
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School
1-1-2007
The Protection of Religious Freedom Under the
American Constitution
Robert A. Sedler
Wayne State University, rsedler@wayne.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Robert A. Sedler, The Protection of Religious Freedom Under the American Constitution, 53 Wayne L. Rev. 817 (2007).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/87
ESSAY: THE PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
UNDER THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
ROBERT A. SEDLERt
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION: THE TWO-FOLD CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ........................................................................ 817
A. Religious Freedom is a Favored Value in the American
Constitutional System .............................................................. 817
B. The Establishment Clause as a Protector of Religious
F reedom .................................................................................... 8 19
C. The Role of the Free Exercise Clause ....................................... 823
D. The Affirmative Protection of Religious Freedom: The Interaction
of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause ..... 826
II. C ON CLUSION .................................................................................... 832
I. INTRODUCTION: THE Two-FOLD CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A. Religious Freedom is a Favored Value in the American Constitutional
System
It is the first guarantee of the First Amendment, which begins with
"[N]o law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. . . ."' The First Amendment was enacted against the
background of an established church in Great Britain during the colonial
period and the official persecution of religious dissenters in Great Britain
and colonial America.2 It provides a two-fold protection to freedom of
religion by what we refer to as the "religion clauses." The Establishment
Clause protects against the "establishment" of an official church by the
government and against governmental action "establishing religion,"
while the free exercise clause is a textual guarantee of peoples' right to
practice their religion and to hold and act on religious beliefs, free from
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, J.D., 1959,
University of Pittsburgh. This Essay is an updated and footnoted version of the Second
Annual Gibbs Lecture delivered by the author at Wayne State University in February of
2005. From 2000-2005, the author held the Gibbs Chair in Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties at Wayne State University School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See the discussion of the historical background of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment in Everson v. New Jersey, 330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947).
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governmental interference.3
I want to emphasize this two-fold protection of religious freedom
under the American Constitution. It is possible in a democratic society
for governmental establishment of religion to coexist with religious
freedom. In Great Britain, for example, there is still the official Church
of England and Church of Scotland, supported by public funds, but there
is also the guarantee of religious freedom for other denominations.4
Similarly, in Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains a
freedom of conscience and religion clause, but no establishment clause.
The reason for this is that in Canada the government continues to support
Protestant and Catholic religious schools as part of the pact between the
Founding Nations at the time of Confederation.5 But our approach is
different, and as a matter of constitutional structure, we protect religious
freedom both by prohibiting the government from "advancing or
inhibiting religion"-the establishment clause requires that the
government pursue a policy of complete official neutrality toward
religion 6 - and by specifically guaranteeing religious freedom.7
3. As the Supreme Court has stated: "The structure of our government has, for the
preservation of religious liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious
interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of civil
authority." Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
Religious freedom means freedom with respect to religious belief - the belief in the
existence or non-existence of a Supreme Being, and the nature and manifestation of such
existence. In this sense, all people, secularists, atheists and agnostics, as well as religious
adherents, have religious beliefs, and the religion clauses protect peoples' freedom with
respect to those beliefs.
See id. at 15-16.
4. For an interesting case discussing the relationship between the Church of England
and the government in the context of a challenge to the Church of England's decision to
ordain women as priests, see Reverend Williams v. Archbishop of Canterbury and Others,
Chancery Division, THE TIMES, Nov. 25, 1994; THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 14, 1994.
5. See Adler v. Ontario, 1996 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 85 (Can. 1996) (holding that the
refusal of a province to fund the religious schools operated by other religions did not
violate the freedom of conscience and religion or the equality provisions of the Charter of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
6. See, e.g., School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963). As the Supreme Court has stated:
The Free Exercise Clause'[s] purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by
prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free
exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against
him in the practice of his religion.
Id. at 223.
7. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (stating that "[t]he
established principle [is] that the government must pursue a course of complete official
neutrality toward religion.").
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B. The Establishment Clause as a Protector of Religious Freedom
I want to begin by focusing on the function of the Establishment
Clause as a protector of religious freedom. When the courts strike down
governmental action advancing religion as a violation of the
Establishment Clause, such as when they hold that the Establishment
Clause prohibits school-sponsored prayer or bible reading in the public
schools,8 or that it prohibits the use of public funds for religious
purposes, 9 the courts are not acting with hostility toward religion, but
rather are acting to protect the religious freedom of all of us, and
particularly the freedom of religious minorities. To illustrate, the
religious freedom of some public school students will be impinged if
they are forced to participate in teacher-led prayer or to suffer
embarrassment by asking to be excused from class. The use of public
funds to support one religion or some religions violates the religious
freedom of those who are non-believers or not members of the benefited
religion, since their money is being used to support a competitive
religious belief. The display of a purely religious symbol such as a
Nativity Scene on a city hall front lawn sends a message to non-
Christians that their beliefs are not favored in that political community
and that they are not full members of that community. 10
The underlying theory of the Establishment Clause then is that
prohibiting the government from taking actions to advance or inhibit
religion will serve to protect the religious freedom of all of us, and
particularly the freedom of religious minorities. I think that this point is
often not fully understood by religious believers, who may see such
restrictions as demonstrating hostility to religion. Again, it is not hostility
to religion, but a structural concern for religious freedom that prohibits
the government from using its power to advance or inhibit religion.1" At
least this is the theory of our Constitution.
Moreover, the fact that the Constitution prohibits the government
8. See, e.g., Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
9. See, e.g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
10. See Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 595
(1989); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). But see Van Norden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that the
inclusion of a Ten Commandments monument along with 17 other monuments and
historical markers on the Texas State Capitol Grounds did not violate the Establishment
Clause). However, these cases also hold that when a religious symbol is included as a
part of a larger display consisting primarily of secular symbols, the effect of the display is
not to send a message of endorsement of religion, and the display does not violate the
establishment clause.
11. See Jaffiree, 472 U.S. at 104-06.
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from taking actions to advance or inhibit religion does not in any way
violate the religious freedom of religious believers. It merely prevents
them from using the power of the government to advance their own
religious beliefs. They are free to advance those beliefs without the
assistance of the government. If parents want their children to learn to
pray, they can teach their children themselves or attend religious worship
with them. If they want their children to have a religiously-based
education, they can send them to sectarian schools. 12 And even in the
public schools, students who wish to pray may do so on their own and
may form prayer clubs, which are entitled to equal access to school
facilities with other student groups.' 3 And since, as we will see, the
government may take action that is precisely tailored to protect the
religious freedom of individuals, when students are required by their
religion to pray during school hours, the school may, consistent with the
Establishment Clause, excuse them from class and provide them with a
place to pray, as the Dearborn, Michigan public schools do for their
Muslim students. Similarly, while public funds may not be used to
support religion, religious people may use their own funds to do so and
receive a tax break at the same time, since the Establishment Clause
permits the government to include religious contributions and church-
owned property along with educational and charitable contributions and
property in a tax deduction or exemption.' 4 And Christians wishing to
celebrate Christmas with the display of a Nativity Scene can place one on
their front lawn or ask their church place one in front of the church.
The Establishment Clause also provides certain specific protections
for religious institutions so that they are free to carry out their religious
mission. The Establishment clause itself specifically provides certain
protections to religious freedom. Since the Establishment Clause
prohibits the government from giving a preference for one religion over
another, it has been held unconstitutional for a state to require the
registration as a charitable organization of only those religious groups
that received more than half of their funds from non-members.' 5
Moreover, under the Establishment Clause, the civil courts may not
become involved with matters of religious doctrine, but must defer to the
resolution of these issues by the highest tribunal of a hierarchical church
authority.16 Thus, the courts cannot interfere with the decisions of the
appropriate ecclesiastical authority within the church as to what persons
are entitled to serve as ecclesiastical officials.' 7 Nor may they become
12. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
13. See Board of Education v. Westside Community Schools, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
14. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390 (1983).
15. See Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982).
16. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09
(1976).
17. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 711 (citing Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1929): "In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the
[Vol. 53:817
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involved in disputes between church factions over control over church
property, with each group claiming to have the "true faith," but must
defer to the determination of which group has the "true faith" that has
been made by the highest tribunal of a hierarchical church organization.
18
Similarly, both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause invalidate laws that expressly discriminate against religion or
against people because of their religious beliefs, such as a law that
disqualifies members of the clergy from serving as legislators, 19 or a law
requiring a declaration of a belief in the existence of God as a test for
holding public office.20
Continuing with the principle of neutrality, not hostility toward
religion, the Court has held that in some circumstances, the government
does not violate the establishment clause when it includes the religious
with the secular in the receipt of governmental benefits, and to this extent
the Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause in a manner that
protects the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions.
Examples of the permissible non-discriminatory inclusion of the
religious with the secular include providing tax exemptions for
contributions to or for property owned by religious, charitable, and
educational organizations;21 allowing parents to take tax deductions for
educational expenses, notwithstanding that most of the deductions will
be taken for tuition payments made by parents who are sending their
children to sectarian schools; 22 allowing a blind student to use state
payments provided to such students for educational purposes to attend a
religiously-affiliated college in order to pursue a religious vocation.23
decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive,
because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.").
18. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); Presbyterian Church v. Hull
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). But
cf Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (holding that when the form of church
organization is congregational rather than hierarchical, the courts may, consistent with
the Establishment Clause, apply general principles of contract and property law to
determine which of the contending factions is entitled to the church property).
19. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978)
20. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3
(prohibiting specifically, a religious test as a qualification for holding federal office). In
Church of the Lukumi Babaluaye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the Court
found that a city's enactment of a number of laws prohibiting "animal sacrifice" was
directed against the Santeria religion, which practices "animal sacrifice" as an essential
part of its religious beliefs. Id. at 534. The Court then held that the challenged laws
violated the Free Exercise Clause, because they had the impermissible purpose of
interfering with the religious freedom of the Santerian adherents and could not be
justified as being "narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest." Id.
at 547.
21. See Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970).
22. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.
23. See Witters v. Washington Department of Services foi" the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
489 (1986).
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Similarly, while the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from
providing financial assistance to sectarian schools, it permits the state to
provide many benefits to the children attending such schools. These
include bus transportation, 24 the loan of state-approved textbooks in
secular subjects, 25 sign language interpreters, 26 diagnostic and remedial
services,27 and even instruction in "enrichment" secular subjects by
public school teachers in the sectarian schools themselves.28 Finally, the
Court has held that providing students and religious groups with equal
access to school buildings after hours and to other public facilities does
not violate the Establishment Clause, so that the government is
constitutionally required to provide such access under the First
Amendment's public forum doctrine.29
Let me summarize what I have said thus far about the Establishment
Clause and the protection of religious freedom. First and most
importantly, the underlying theory of the Establishment Clause is that
prohibiting the government from taking actions to advance or inhibit
religion will serve to protect the religious freedom of all of us, and
particularly the freedom of religious minorities. Second, the
Establishment Clause itself specifically provides certain protections to
religious freedom, such as by invalidating laws that expressly
discriminate against religion or against people because of their religious
beliefs. Third, in some circumstances the government may, consistent
with the Establishment Clause, include the religious with the secular in
the receipt of governmental benefits, such as by providing many of the
same benefits to students attending sectarian schools as it provides to
24. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
25. See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
26. See Zoberst v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
27. See Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 648 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
28. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997). In Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793 (2000), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a program under which public
funds were used to purchase instructional equipment and materials, such as media
material and computer software and hardware, that were loaned to children attending
public and private schools, including children attending parochial schools. The Court was
highly fragmented on the question of whether it was constitutionally permissible for
public funds to be used in this way, with the "swing Justices" concluding that the
program contained sufficient safeguards to prevent diversion of the instructional material
for religious use. Id. at 861.
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), the Court was again highly
fragmented, but held that in certain circumstances the state could provide tuition
vouchers that school children could use at parochial schools. The program in that case
provided a number of different forms of financial assistance to parents of low-income
children attending poorly-performing public schools, including, along with the vouchers,
attendance at "community" and "magnet" schools. Id. at 647. The Court majority
concluded that the program was one of "true private choice" and so did not violate the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 653.
29. See Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001); Capitol
Square Review Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
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students attending public schools.
C. The Role of the Free Exercise Clause
We now turn to the Free Exercise Clause, which is a specific textual
guarantee of peoples' right to practice their religion and to hold and act
on religious beliefs, free from governmental interference. 30 However,
because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause
very broadly, some of the protection for religious freedom that might
otherwise have been dependent on the Free Exercise Clause has in fact
been afforded by the Establishment Clause. For example, it is not
necessary for the Court to decide whether school-sponsored prayer in the
public schools violates the Free Exercise rights of non-believers and
religious minorities, since school-sponsored prayer violates the
Establishment Clause. 3' The same observation may be made with respect
to the interference with the religious freedom of non-believers and
religious minorities that would be caused by the use of public funds to
support a competitive religious belief and the interference with the
religious freedom of non-Christians caused by the display of a Nativity
Scene on a city hall front lawn.32 Indeed, as a general proposition, we
may say that any determination that governmental action has violated the
Establishment Clause has subsumed any claim that such action violates
the Free Exercise Clause and to this extent, the Establishment Clause has
supplanted the Free Exercise Clause as the primary means of protecting
religious freedom under the American Constitution.
What then is the role of the Free Exercise Clause in protecting
religious freedom under the American Constitution? First, as we have
pointed the Free Exercise Clause invalidates laws that expressly
discriminate against religion or against people because of their religious
beliefs, such as a law that disqualifies members of the clergy from
serving as legislators, or a law requiring a declaration of a belief in the
existence of God as a test for holding public office.33 In the same vein,
the Court has invalidated under the Free Exercise Clause, a municipal
ordinance prohibiting "animal sacrifice," which, the Court found, was
directed against the Santeria religion, which practices "animal sacrifice"
as an essential part of its religious beliefs.34 Second the Free Exercise
Clause provides a textual basis for challenging truly neutral laws-laws
that cannot be challenged as violating the Establishment Clause-that
impact on a person's religious beliefs or practices by (1) compelling
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31. See Jaifree, 472 U.S. at 60.
32. See, e.g., Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000);
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Schempp 374 U.S. 203; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. 573.
33. See supra notes 20, 21.
34. See Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547.
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people to do something that their religion forbids, such as a requirement
of compulsory school attendance applied to a religious group whose
religion prohibits children from attending school beyond a certain age,35
or (2) forbidding people from doing something that their religion
requires, such as a law forbidding the use of illegal drugs as applied to a
religious group such as the Native American Church whose religion
requires the use of peyote in their religious services, 36 or (3) a law that
imposes a burden on a person because of that person's religious beliefs,
such as a law denying unemployment compensation to persons who are
not available for Saturday work, as applied to a Sabbatarian who is
unable to work on Saturday because of religious beliefs.37
The Court, however, has been reluctant to interpret the Free
Exercise Clause too expansively, lest it end up with a Free Exercise-
mandated exemption from laws of general application. Indeed, in the
very first case involving a constitutional challenge under the Free
Exercise Clause, Reynolds v. United States, decided in 1879, the Court
held that the federal law prohibiting polygamy did not violate the free
exercise rights of a Utah polygamist. 38 In the much more recent case of
Employment Division v. Smith, decided over 100 years later, the Court
held that as a general proposition the Free Exercise Clause did not
require that the government exempt religiously-motivated conduct from
neutral and generally applicable criminal laws, and so the government
could constitutionally prohibit the use of peyote in the religious services
of the Native American Church. 3 9  Along these lines, the Court has
upheld the following applications of facially neutral laws against Free
Exercise challenge: a law requiring the payment of social security taxes
as applied to members of a traditional religious community whose
religion prohibited both the payment of social security taxes and the
receipt of social security benefits; 40 a law denying a federal tax
exemption to a private schools, such as Bob Jones University, that
practiced racial discrimination on the basis of sincerely held religious
beliefs;4' a law requiring compulsory military service by persons who
opposed a particular war- instead of all war- on the basis of conscience
and religion;42 and a military dress regulation, since modified by Federal
statute, that prohibited an Orthodox Jewish officer from wearing a
35. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (sustaining a Free Exercise Clause
challenge).
36. See Employment Div. Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(rejecting a Free Exercise challenge).
37. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (sustaining a Free Exercise
challenge).
38. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
39. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), superseded by statute, as recognized in Gonzales v. 0
Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006).
40. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982).
41. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983).
42. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 463 (1971).
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skullcap, in accordance with his religious beliefs.43
The Court has been somewhat more receptive to Free Exercise
claims that compliance with a facially neutral law imposes a burden on a
person because of that person's religious beliefs, and in these cases has
discounted the importance of the government's interest in imposing the
particular restriction.44 In a series of cases, the Court has held that the
government cannot condition the availability of unemployment
compensation upon a person's willingness to work under conditions
forbidden by that person's religion, such as requiring a Sabbatarian to be
available for Saturday work,45 or discharging a person for refusing to
work in weapons production, contrary to his religious beliefs.46 The
Court has also held that a state could not constitutionally deny welfare
benefits to a family that had refused on religious grounds to fumish their
governmentally-assigned social security number to the welfare officials,
since the welfare officials could require other means of identification.47
But even here, the Court has interpreted the Free Exercise Clause
narrowly.48 During the time of Sunday closing laws, it upheld against
Free Exercise challenge a requirement that a person who observed the
Sabbath on Saturday and thus closed his place of business on that day,
comply with the state's Sunday closing law, designed to achieve a
uniform day of rest for all employees.49 It has also rejected a Free
Exercise challenge to the refusal of prison authorities to excuse inmates
from work requirements so that they could attend religious services,
50
and has held that the Free Exercise Clause did not preclude the federal
government from carrying out logging and road construction in a
national forest, although this would seriously interfere with the use of the
forest for religious purposes by Native-American groups.5'
We see then that the Free Exercise Clause provides some protection
against the application of facially neutral laws that interfere with or
burden an individual's freedom to act on the basis of religious beliefs.
43. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986), superseded by statute, as
indicated in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005).
44. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136
(1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
45. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. 136; Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (overruled by Smith,
494 U.S. at 844, superseded by statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - bb-4 (2005), which has been found unconstitutional as to state
and local governments in City of Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997).
46. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
47. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
48. Id.
49. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961).
50. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 344 (1987), superseded by
statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb - bb-4, as stated in Village of Bensenville v. Federal Aviation Admin.457
F.3d. 52, 60 n. I (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
51. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42
(1988).
20071
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
On the whole, however, the Court has not been willing to impose Free
Exercise-required exemptions from the application of facially-neutral
and generally applicable laws, and for this reason as well as the
subsuming of some Free Exercise claims by the Establishment Clause,
the protection provided to religious freedom by the Free Exercise Clause
is considerably less than the protection provided by the Establishment
Clause.
D. The Affirmative Protection of Religious Freedom: The Interaction of
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
This brings me to what I think is the most interesting part of the
constitutional protection of religious freedom, the affirmative efforts on
the part of the government to protect the religious freedom of individuals
and religious institutions. Here we see the interaction of the
Establishment Clause with the Free Exercise Clause to advance the
constitutional value of religious freedom.52 The operative principle in
this area may be stated as follows. Governmental action that has the
effect of providing a preference for religion over non-religion violates
the Establishment Clause, but governmental action that is precisely
tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious
institutions does not violate the Establishment Clause.5 3 The crucial
question in these cases, therefore, is whether the governmental action is
an unconstitutional preference for religion, or a precisely tailored and so
constitutionally permissible means of protecting the religious freedom of
individuals and religious institutions.54
Let me explain why this is so. When the government gives a
preference for religion over non-religion, it is violating the overriding
principle of the Establishment Clause, which is that the government must
pursue a course of complete official neutrality toward religion.55 This
overriding principle is not obviated by the claim that the government is
trying to make an "accommodation" for religion.56 It is precisely because
the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is one of complete
official neutrality toward religion that the government may not make an
"accommodation" for religion by giving a preference for religion over
non-religion.57 Thus the Court has found an Establishment Clause
violation in the following preference cases: a state law providing an
exemption from the state sales tax for religious periodicals alone;58 a
52. There is room for play in the joints between the Clauses.
53. Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause: The Perspective of
Constitutional Litigation, 43 WAYNE L. REv. 1317, 1356-58 (1997).
54. Id. at 1419-37
55. Id. at 1322.
56. Cf id. at 1323.
57. Id. at 1338-43.
58. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
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state law that gave churches the power to prevent the issuance of a liquor
license to a business that would be located within 500 feet of the
church;59 a state law setting up a special school district embracing the
boundaries of a religious community; 60 and a state law entitling an
employee to take off work on the day that the employee stated that he or
she observed as the Sabbath, without any requirement that the
employee's religion precluded the employee from working on the
Sabbath or even that the employee used that day for religious purposes. 61
Conversely, when the government takes action that is precisely
tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious
institutions, it is acting to protect the religious freedom that is the
concern of both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
Religious freedom is thus a favored constitutional value, and it would be
inconsistent with the overriding purpose of the religion clauses, taken
together, to hold that the Establishment Clause precludes the government
from taking such action. It is irrelevant in this regard that the failure of
the government to take such action and the application of facially neutral
laws to individuals and religious institutions would not violate the Free
Exercise Clause. The measure of what the government cannot do is not
the measure of what the government can do. So long as the government's
action is precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals
and religious institutions, that action advances the overriding purpose of
the religion clauses taken as a whole and so does not violate the
Establishment Clause.
In order to satisfy the standard of "precisely tailored to protect the
religious freedom of an individual or religious institution" the action
must be directed toward obviating an interference with religious
freedom.62 An interference with an individual's religious freedom occurs
when the individual is prevented from doing something that his or her
religion requires, such as when a member of the Native-American
Church being prevented from using peyote in a religious ceremony, or
when someone is compelled to do something that the person's religion
prohibits, such as being compelled to work on the Sabbath, which the
religion dictates be a day of complete rest. An interference with the
freedom of a religious institution occurs when the law prevents the
institution from carrying out its religious function, such as a law
prohibiting a religious institution from employing only its adherents in
the religious activities of the institution or a zoning law prohibiting the
construction of a religious facility in a residential area.
59. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982).
60. See Board of Education v. Kiryas Joel Village School District, 512 U.S. 687, 690
(1994).
61. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985).
62. See Sedler, supra note 53, at 1425-27.
63. See generally Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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Applying the standard of "precisely tailored to protect the religious
freedom of an individual or religious institution", the courts have upheld
a number of governmental actions against Establishment Clause
challenge. The Supreme Court has upheld Title VII's "religious entities"
exemption, which exempts religious institutions from Title VII's
religious discrimination prohibition with respect to employing
individuals of the same religion to carry out the work of the organization,
including the institution's non-profit secular activities.64 The Court has
also held Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination requires
an employer to make a "reasonable accommodation" for an employee's
religious beliefs, so long as this can be done without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business.65 It may be noted that the
"reasonable accommodation" provision has been interpreted very
narrowly so as to meet the "precisely tailored" standard and so be
constitutionally permissible. Thus, an employer was not required to
accommodate a Sabbatarian's effort to avoid Saturday work when this
would require the employer to disregard the seniority system that had
been provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. 66 An example
of a required "reasonable accommodation" was where two Jewish
employees of a skin care salon had made a request two weeks in advance
that they be permitted to take off work on Yom Kippur, the holiest
Jewish holiday, and where the employer could have reassigned or
67rescheduled their previously-booked appointments. Another example of
a "reasonable accommodation" is the "substituted charity" provision of
federal labor relations law, which enables persons who have religious
objections to joining unions to avoid paying union dues or representation
fees and instead make a charitable contribution in an equivalent
amount.68
Other permissible actions designed to protect the religious freedom
of individuals actions include: an exemption from the former Sunday
closing laws for Sabbatarians who closed their businesses on Saturday;
69
during Prohibition the exemption for sacramental wine used in religious
services, 7° and a modem equivalent, the exemption from the federal
substance abuse laws for the use of peyote in the religious ceremonies of
Native-American tribes; an exemption from the federal Eagle Protection
64. See Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 339 (1987).
65. See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
66. Id. at 84.
67. See EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th Cir. 1997).
68. See, e.g., Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1981).
69. See, e.g., Arlan's Dep't. Store, Inc. v. Kentucky, 357 S.W.2d 808 (Ky.1962),
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 218 (1962). In Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608, where the Court
held that the state's failure to provide such an exemption did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause, the Court noted that a number of states did provide such an exemption and noted
that this may well be the wiser solution to the problem.
70. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210; Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878
F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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Act to permit members of Native-American tribes to use eagle feathers in
their religious services; 7' the exemption in the federal Humane Slaughter
Law for Jewish religious slaughter and now for Halal religious slaughter
and for that of all religious faiths that use the severance of the carotid
artery method of slaughter;72 an exemption from social security self-
employment taxes for members of religious sects that have tenets
opposed to participation in the social security system and that provide
reasonable support for their dependent members; 73 and an exemption for
Amish buggies from the requirement that slow-moving vehicles display a
special emblem. 74 And, of course, the government may take actions to
protect the religious freedom of persons subject to governmental control,
such as where the Dearborn public schools make arrangements for their
Moslem students to pray at required times during school hours, and the
military and prison systems trying to accommodate the religious needs of
persons under their control by providing them with chaplains, releasing
them for religious services, excusing them from uniform requirements,
and enabling them to observe religious dietary restrictions.75
This brings us to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA) 76 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000 (RLUIPA) 77 and the concluding part of this presentation. In an
71. See Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992). In
this case, the exemption for the use of eagle feathers for religious purposes by members
of Native-American tribes was challenged by a member of an "all-race" church that
followed Native-American religious customs, including the ceremonial use of eagle
feathers. They asserted that the exemption constituted a preference for one religion over
another, but the court was able to avoid the religious preference claim by finding that the
exemption was based on the sovereignty of the Native-American tribes and their special
relationship to the federal government. Id. at 33-35; C.f Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974). The courts also relied on the sovereignty and special relationship justification to
avoid the religious preference claim in the peyote use cases. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 922
F.2d 1210; Olsen, 878 F.2d 1458. If the peyote exemption had been for use by all
religious groups, as opposed to ordinary drug users, there would be no question but that it
was a constitutionally permissible means of protecting the religious freedom of
individuals and religious institutions. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d at 1344. In Gonzales,
discussed infra at note 98, the Court referred to "the well-established peyote exception"
and noted that this exception fatally undermines the Government's broader contention
that the Controlled Substances Act establishes a closed regulatory system that admits of
no exceptions under RFRA. Id. at 1222.
72. See Jones v. Butz, 374 F.Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
73. See Droz v. Comm'r of IRS, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995).
74. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minin.1990) (holding that such an
exemption was required by the state constitution and did not violate the Establishment
Clause).
75. See, e.g., Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.1985) (rejecting an
Establishment Clause challenge to the military chaplaincy). Congress had by statute
overturned the headgear regulation upheld against Free Exercise challenge in Goldman,
so as to permit the wearing of religiously-required headgear by military personnel. See 10
U.S.C. § 774 (1994)).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - bb-4 (2005).
77. Id.
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effort to overcome the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause and protect the religious freedom of individuals and
religious institutions, 78  Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993. The Act applied to all federal and state laws and
provided that whenever any law "substantially burdened" a person's
exercise of religion, the government had to demonstrate that the law was
in the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and that it was
the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. 79 This would be so
even if the "substantial burden" on a person's exercise of religion
resulted from a rule of general applicability.80 In 1997, the Supreme
Court held that the Act was unconstitutional in its application to the
states as being beyond Congress' enforcement power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.8' In 2000, Congress came back with
RLUIPA, a much narrower law enacted under the spending power, and
applicable only to programs or activities receiving federal assistance.82
RLUIPA imposes the compelling governmental interest test to determine
the validity of land use regulations that impose a substantial burden on
the religious exercise of a person or religious institution and the validity
of institutional regulations that impose a substantial burden on the
religious practices of institutionalized persons.8 3 When I presented the
Gibbs Lecture in February, 2005, the Supreme Court was reviewing a
Sixth Circuit decision that had held that in its application to prison
inmates, RLIPUA violated the Establishment Clause, because it favors
religious rights over other fundamental rights without any showing that
religious rights are at any greater risk of deprivation in the prison
context.84 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, by contrast, had held that the
application of the Act in the prison context does not violate the
Establishment Clause, because Congress may lift a burden on religious
worship in institutions without affording corresponding protection to
secular activities or to non-religious prisoners. 85 As the Ninth Circuit put
it, "RLIUPA merely accommodates and protects the free exercise of
religion, which the Constitution allows.9,
86
In the Lecture, I stated as follows:
78. Specifically the Court's decision in Smith, 494 U.S. at 897-98. In Smith the Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the government from burdening
religious practices through generally applicable laws, and that laws imposing such a
burden did not have to be justified under the exacting compelling governmental interest
standard of review. Id.
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb -bb-4.
80. Id.
81. See Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2005).
85. See Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003); Mayweathers v. Newland,
314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002).
86. Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1069.
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I submit that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have it right and that the
Sixth Circuit, with all due respect to the Circuit of which we are a
part, has it wrong. Religious freedom is a favored value in our
constitutional system, and as I believe I have demonstrated in this
presentation, the Establishment Clause permits the government to
take action that is precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom
of individuals and religious institutions. This is because, as again I
believe I have demonstrated, the protection of religious freedom is
the concern of both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause, and it would be inconsistent with the overriding purposes of
the religion clauses, taken together, to hold that the Establishment
Clause precludes the governmerit from taking action that is precisely
tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious
institutions. I hope that the Supreme Court will so hold in the case
before it this Term.
And so it did. In Cutter v. Wilkinson,87 the Court unanimously held
that the application of RLUIPA to protect the religious practices of the
prison inmates that were at issue in that case did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The Court first noted that, it "has long recognized
that the government may . . . accommodate religious practices . . .
without violating the Establishment Clause," 88 and that "there is room for
play in the joints between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate
religion beyond free exercise requirements, without offense to the
Establishment Clause.,
89
It then noted that Congress had documented in hearings spanning
three years that "frivolous or arbitrary" barriers impeded institutionalized
persons' religious exercise. The Court then found that on its face,
RLUIPA "qualifies as a permissible legislative accommodation of
religion that is not barred by the Establishment Clause."90 This was
because it "alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private
religious exercise'91 and "protects institutionalized persons who are
unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore
dependent on the government's permission and accommodation for
exercise of their religion. 9 2 Moreover, RLUIPA would be applied in an
87. 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
88. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 713.
89. Id. (citing Hobbie 480 U.S. at 144-45; Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718
(2004)). In Locke the Court held that although the state would not be violating the
Establishment Clause if it permitted state scholarship funds to be used for theology
courses, the state did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by prohibiting the use of state
scholarship funds for this purpose. Id.
90. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716.
91. Id. at 720.
92. Id.
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"appropriately balanced way with particular sensitivity to security
concerns." 93 Finally, the Court concluded that the Sixth Circuit had
misunderstood the Court's precedents when it held that the government
could not give greater protection to religious rights than to other
constitutionally protected rights. If this were the law, said the Court, "all
manner of religious accommodations would fail, '94 and the Court had
held in other cases, most notably Presiding Bishop,95 that religious
accommodations need not "come packaged with benefits to secular
entities., 96 The Court thus upheld against Establishment Clause
challenge the provisions of RLUIPA requiring the state to make a
reasonable accommodation for the religious needs of institutionalized
persons. The Court's decision in Cutter strongly affirms the principle
that the government can, consistent with the Establishment Clause, take
action that is precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of
individuals and religious institutions.97
II. CONCLUSION
It is on this point that we may end. In this presentation, I have tried
to demonstrate that the overriding purpose of the religion clauses, taken
together, is to protect religious freedom in this Nation. The
Establishment Clause protects religious freedom by prohibiting the
government from taking action that advances or inhibits religion and it
interacts with the Free Exercise Clause to provide affirmative protection
for the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions. I
believe that on the whole, the overriding purpose of the Establishment
Clause has been achieved, and that at this point in time, religious
freedom is secure in this Nation.
93. Id. at 722.
94. Id. at 724.
95. 483 U.S. 327.
96. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 724 (citing Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 338).
97. In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006), the Court applied RFRA to invalidate the application of Schedule I of the
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2005), Schedule I (c) to the use of
hoasca, a tea containing a hallucinogen, in the religious ceremonies of a very small sect
in the United States. The Court held that RFRA and RLIUPA require case-by-case
consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable rules and that the
government bears the burden of demonstrating that serious harm would result from the
granting of specific exemptions to particular religious claimants. The government could
not sustain its burden in this case, just as the state prison system could not sustain the
burden in Cutter. The Court also referred to the "well-established" peyote exception
discussed earlier, supra at note 73 and accompanying text, noted that this exception
"fatally undermines the Government's broader contention that the Controlled Substances
Act establishes a closed regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under RFRA."
Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 433.
[Vol. 53:817
